A non-uniform bin packing game is an N-person cooperative game, where the set N is defined by k bins of capacities b 1 , . . . , b k and n items of sizes a 1 , . . . , a n . The objective function v of a coalition is the maximum total value of the items of that coalition which can be packed to the bins of that coalition. We investigate the taxation model of Faigle and Kern (1993) [2] and show that the 1/2-core is always nonempty for such bin packing games. If all items have size strictly larger than 1/3, we show that the 5/12-core is always non-empty. Finally, we investigate the limiting case k → ∞, thereby extending the main result in Faigle and Kern (1998) [3] to the non-uniform case.
Introduction
A cooperative game is defined by a tuple ⟨N, v⟩, where N is a (finite) set of players and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic (value) function satisfying v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N is called a coalition and N itself is the grand coalition. Usually, v(S) stands for the total earning (or total cost) of a coalition S.
In a cooperative game, the players of the grand coalition N are agreed to cooperate if there is a ''fair'' allocation of the value v(N) among the individual players. One of the most attractive solution concepts is the core of a game, defined as the set of vectors x ∈ R N satisfying (i) x(N) = v(N), (ii) x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N.
As usual, we denote by x(S) =  i∈S x i . We say a game is balanced if it possesses a nonempty core. Unfortunately, many games are not balanced. This means players in a non-balanced game may not cooperate because there is no ''fairness''. For this case, one has to seek for a completely different solution concept (e.g. Shapley Value) or one has to modify the notion of ''core''. Several models for the latter have been established (see Shapley and Shubik [6] , Tijs and Driessen [7] ). In our paper, we analyze the (multiplicative) ϵ-core (cf. [2] ), defined by the condition (i) above together with (ii
We can interpret the condition as a taxation rate ϵ in the sense that the players in S can keep only a (1 − ϵ) fraction of their earnings on their own if they cooperate. This is the usual idea behind a sales tax and, therefore, appears to be quite realistic/acceptable for the players.
A game with non-empty ϵ-core is called ϵ-balanced. In this sense, ϵ-taxation provides an ϵ-approximation to balancedness. It can be easily seen that the 1-core is always non-empty for all games with v ≥ 0. In general, we seek to find a ''proper'' (as small as possible) taxation rate ϵ such that the ϵ-core is non-empty for a given class of games.
In [3] , Faigle and Kern studied (uniform) bin packing games and provided a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the ϵ-core, based on the linear programming description of the core (cf. below). We extend this result to the more general class of superadditive games. Recall has optimal objective function value v(N). Indeed, suppose S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S t ⊆ N are the coalitions ''selected'' by an optimal solution of (1.3), i.e., y(S i ) = 1, for i = 1, . . . , t and y(S) = 0 for S ̸ = S 1 , . . . , S t . Then S i ∩ S j = ∅, for i ̸ = j. The optimal objective function value is
Let us denote by v ′ (N) the optimal objective function value of (1.2). As explained above, v(N) is the optimal objective function value of its 0-1 integer linear program (1.3). The necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the ϵ-core is given below (cf. [3] for the uniform bin packing game). The proof is identical to the one given in [3] . We include it for convenience of the reader. 4) and it gives ϵ
, hence ϵ ≥ε and let y be an optimal solution of (1.1). We claim x = (1 −ε)y is in the ϵ-core of N, by verifying the two conditions as below (where we denote y(S) =  S⊆N y S as before):
This provides us with a powerful tool for analyzing the minimal taxation rate of bin packing games. In Section 2, we introduce non-uniform bin packing games and prove that the 1/2-core is always nonempty. In Section 3, we derive a somewhat stronger result for the special case where all item sizes are strictly larger than 1/3. There we will also try to point out why non-uniform bin packing games are much more complicated than uniform ones. Finally, in Section 4, we extend the main result of [3] about the limiting case (total number of bins k → ∞).
Non-uniform bin packing games
Nowadays, as online shopping has become so popular, delivering goods by means of transport firms is a steadily growing business. The question therefore arises how transport costs should be compensated in a ''fair way''. Currently, usually weight and/or volume are used as indicators for transport costs. Motivated by this observation, it seems natural, to study bin packing games as defined below as a first step towards analyzing allocation problems of this kind. It is quite possible that more elaborate concepts like, e.g., knapsack or two-dimensional bin packing lead to even more insight also in real world scenarios.
Suppose there are two disjoint sets of players, say, A and B. Each player i ∈ A possesses an item of value/size a i , for i = 1, . . . , n, and each player j ∈ B possesses a truck/bin of capacity b j . The items produce a profit proportional to their size a i if they are brought to the market place. The value v(N) of the grand coalition thus represents the maximum profit achievable. How should v(N) be allocated to the owners of the items and the owners of the trucks? Faigle and Kern [2] first studied this problem and observed that the 1/2-core is always nonempty, provided that any item fits into each bin. It is also shown that for any ϵ < 1/7, one can always find an instance such that the ϵ-core is empty. Hence, the minimal ϵ (ensuring a nonempty ϵ-core for all instances) is ≥ 1/7.
Afterwards, researchers focused on bin packing games with uniform capacities (b j = 1 for all j). Woeginger [8] showed that the 1/3-core is always nonempty-a result that was slightly improved later by Kern and Qiu [4] , i.e., (1/3 − 1/108)-core is always nonempty. Kuipers [5] considered the special case of item sizes strictly larger than 1/3 and proved that the 1/7-core is nonempty and that this bound is tight. Faigle and Kern [3] showed that for any fixed ϵ, the ϵ-core is nonempty if the number of trucks is sufficiently large.
Results for the general (non-uniform) bin packing games are quite poor. Apparently, the problem becomes more difficult when capacities of trucks are distinct. In particular, the ''matching approach'' used in [3] and [5] cannot be applied any more and new ideas are needed even in the special case of large item sizes (cf. Section 4).
We start with some terminologies We assume that the bins are ordered weakly decreasingly, i.e.,
A set F ⊆ A is called feasible for bin j, if the total size of items of F does not exceed the bin capacity b j . Denote by F the collection of all feasible sets and F j the collection of feasible sets for bin j, j = 1, . . . , k, thus,
Moreover, given a set of items, say F , denote by a F the total size of F , i.e., a F =  i∈F a i . Let F k+1 = ∅. Hence, the value v(N) of the grand coalition equals the optimal objective function value of the following integer linear program. 
Algorithm Simple Packing
Input:
The simple packing algorithm is readily extended to a packing heuristic, constructing an integer packing for N: Let A j ⊆ A denote the set of items that fit into b j . We first apply simple packing to b k and A k . Assume that the simple packing algorithm 
Proof. Apply the simple packing heuristic as described above, starting with
, then each bin gets filled to at least half its capacity (by simple packing).
Otherwise, (ii) follows by letting r denote the smallest j such that indeed all ''remaining'' items were packed into b j+1 , and hence all of A j+1 was packed into bins b j+1 , . . . , b k .
As a simple consequence, we obtain the following. 
Proof. Let v, v
′ denote the optimal integral resp. fractional packing value. Clearly, v ≥ a F 1 + · · · + a F k for the simple packing F 1 , . . . , F k . Thus, in case (i) of Lemma 2.1, we readily find 
Large item sizes a i > 1/3
In the uniform case, instances with large items a i > 1/3 have attracted much attention. In theoretical terms, the case a i > 1/3 is critical for proving non-emptiness of the 1/3-core. In practice, such instances may occur in large express firms which only deal with large goods, i.e., small items are not delivered by them (as delivering small items gains less and causes almost the same administration cost). A standard proof technique for showing non-emptiness of the 1/3-core in the uniform case works as follows: First reduce the problem to the case where all items have size strictly larger than 1/3. In these reduced problem instances, at most two items fit into a bin. Hence a fractional packing is close to a fractional matching of items and can thus be treated with well-known techniques from matching theory. In the non-uniform case, this approach does not work, as we shall explain below. Indeed, it is even unclear whether (2.2) always has an optimal solution that is 1 2 -integral. (In the uniform case, this follows quite easily by standard arguments from (fractional) matching theory, cf., e.g., [3] .)
Still, the reduction to large item sizes can be extended to the non-uniform case, which might be of independent interest: As it turns out, in the non-uniform case we have to distinguish between small and large items, where ''small'' and ''large'' are defined relative to the average bin sizeb =  k j=1 b j /k. 
Case 2: In the optimum integral packing for N, each bin with capacity b j ≥ ϵb is filled to more than b j − a i . In this case, the total content of each bin is at least b j − ϵb, hence
Unfortunately, Lemma 3.1 is of not much help in simplifying matters: Indeed, by adding a number of small dummy bins (plus corresponding items if we like), the average bin size can be made arbitrarily small -and hence the item sizes become relatively large -without significant change in the instance.
If we instead restrict ourselves to item sizes that are large in an absolute sense, the bound ϵ ≤ 1/2 can be somewhat improved (although, as compared to the uniform case, with considerably more effort and weaker result): v ′ . Thus, in what follows, we may (and will) assume that y
Proof of (ii): Assume to the contrary that some item has size a = a max ≥ 2/3. Then a cannot be combined with any other item into a feasible set. Hence there must be a single-item set F s = {a}. (We tacitly assume that item a is used at all-otherwise the Theorem follows by induction on the number of items.) According to (i), we may assume y We first aim at showing that we may assume . Removing b k with all its content and item a ′ from F j (the only two-element set containing a ′ ) results in a feasible fractional packingỹ
By induction, there is a corresponding integral solution of valueṽ ≥
12ṽ
′ . Adding item a ′ (assigned to b k ), we obtain a packing for N of value
This completes the proof of (iii). Having achieved the above three simplifications, we are now ready to proceed to the main part of the proof, which consists in ''rounding'' y ′ to an integer packing y, with value v ≥ 7 12 v ′ . The basic idea is a greedy selection rule similar to the one in [4] . The main difference is that, here, we construct pairwise disjoint feasible sets F j 1 , . . . , F j r in a reverse order, i.e, starting with the smallest feasible two-element set F j rather than with the largest (as we did in [4] ). Thus we let F j 1 ∈ F (assigned to b k !) denote the smallest two-element set in the support of y ′ , and choose it as a feasible set of our integral packing (i.e., y F j 1 = 1). Then we look for the next feasible set among F j 1 −1 , . . . , F 1 that is disjoint from F j 1 and call it F j 2 etc.
Thus in each step we determine the smallest feasible set that is disjoint from all previously selected ones. As each of the selected feasible set F j ρ contains exactly two items, say, F j ρ = {a i , a l }, the total y ′ -value of feasible sets intersecting F j ρ is bounded by 2 − y F jρ , for ρ = 1, . . . , r. (This is straightforward from 
For the remaining k − r bins, w.l.o.g., we assume 1/2 capacity of each bin can be filled by greedily packing items to those bins (as a i < 2/3 < b k for all i, cf. also [2] or apply the simple packing heuristic). Let R be the index set of the remaining k − r bins andb(R) be the corresponding average bin size. In case k is even, we haveb(R) ≥b. Hence,
For k odd, the approximation is even better as we have in addition b 1 filled to at least 2 3 of its capacity. This completes the proof.
The limiting case: k → ∞
In this section, we seek to extend the result of [3] , saying that the ϵ-core is non-empty provided the game is ''large enough'', to the nonuniform case. As in [3] , our arguments are based on the bin packing approach initially introduced by de la Vega and Lueker [1] . Consider the class of bin packing games where the number of distinct item sizes and the number of distinct bin sizes are bounded by m. Assume that the item sizes are a 1 , . . . , a m and occur with multiplicities α 1 , . . . , α m , and assume that the bin sizes are b 1 , . . . , b m and occur with multiplicities β 1 , . . . , β m . Each feasible set F ∈ F can be described by its type vector T = (t 1 , . . . , t m ) indicating the number t i of items of size a i that occur in F . Let
and let T be the set of type vectors. Moreover, for each bin size b j , denote by T j the set of type vectors, with a T ≤ b j for all T ∈ T j . Hence,
Let T m+1 = ∅. Now v and v ′ can be computed by the following (integer) linear programs. Extending this to an integral packing for N in the obvious way (by assigning a set of type T to a bin of type j), the claim follows. Thus we may indeed assume that z * ≤ 1, and hence v Proof. Assume items are given by the following non-decreasingly ordered list,
Given m > 0, m ∈ N and h = ⌊n/m⌋, divide A into m + 1 consecutive sublists
. . , m and |R| < h. Let a i j be the first element of A j . We consider the modified item list 
Denote by v A , v ′ A the integral resp. fractional optimum, with respect to an item list A. Hence,
On the other hand, each feasible fractional packing relative to A also yields a feasible packing of A − if we replace elements of A j by the corresponding elements of A Now consider the bin packing game relative to A − . Assume bin sizes are ordered non-increasingly, i.e.,
We also divide B into m + 1 consecutive sublists On the other hand, each feasible fractional packing relative to B also yields a feasible fractional packing relative to B − if we pack the feasible sets of B j to B 
As ϵ < 1/4, the latter follows from the assumed lower bound on k. We seek to prove that ϵ-core(N)̸ = ∅ provided the game defined by N is ''large'' enough. In [3] , in the uniform case, a sufficient condition in terms of a lower bound k = Ω(ϵ −5 ) was given. Note, however, that we cannot expect such a result to hold for the non-uniform case. Indeed, consider a fixed instance N 0 with minimal tax rate ϵ 0 = ϵ N 0 . Adding arbitrarily many small bins (smaller than a min , the minimum item size), we find that k → ∞ (as well as a B → ∞), while ϵ N remain unaffected. The same argument shows that even the assumptions in Theorem 4.4 cannot guarantee ϵ-balancedness.
Thus, it seems that we should restrict our attention to irreducible games. Alternatively, given an arbitrary game N, we first apply the simple packing algorithm to split N into a reduced game N red and a (possibly empty) trivial game N triv . Then, if the reduced part is (still) large, a lower bound on the minimum taxation rate for N red (and hence for N) follows: Thus, roughly speaking, games with empty ϵ-core are either ''small'' or arise from small games by trivial extensions.
Remarks and open problems
Our results reveal a certain tradeoff between the taxation rate ϵ and the average bin sizeb. This is most evident in Corollary 4.5, but also applies elsewhere. For example, the condition a i > 1/3 in Proposition 3.2 could equally be replaced byb ≥ 4/5, since for ϵ = 5/12, we haveb ≥ 4/5 ⇔ ϵb ≥ 1/3 and hence the result can be obtained via Lemma 3.1. It is not clear to us whether this phenomenon is inherent to the non-uniform case. In particular, if we consider ϵ * := inf N {ϵ | ϵ-core(N) ̸ = ∅} where the infimum is taken over all uniform bin packing games, then it is clear (from [3] ) that it suffices to consider only games up to a certain fixed size of |N|. Is this no longer true in the non-uniform case?
A challenging conjecture of G. J. Woeginger states that, for uniform games, the gap is bounded by a universal constant. Are there any counterexamples at least in the non-uniform case?
Finally, of course a natural question to ask is whether one can improve upon Theorem 2.2 (saying that ϵ * ≤ 1/2 in the non-uniform case). In particular, it is also worthwhile to know whether one can improve the bound 5/12 in Proposition 3.2 for large instances, i.e. a i > 1/3 for all i.
